



## Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [support@jstor.org](mailto:support@jstor.org).

## BOOK REVIEWS.

THE ALCHEMY OF THOUGHT. By L. P. Jacks. New York: Holt, 1911. Pp. 349. Price \$3.00 net.

The *Hibbert Journal* has been before the public for a number of years. It has stood for progress in religion as well as in philosophy, and the latest movements have found an exposition in its columns. Upon the whole one may trace in it the influence of Martineau, the prophet of unitarianism, and also the pragmatism, or indeed pluralism, of Professor James and his adherents. We have now before us a collection of essays written by L. P. Jacks, editor of the *Hibbert Journal*, who at the same time is Dean of Manchester College, Oxford, a dissenter institution. To characterize the tendency of Mr. Jacks we will quote from his preface in his own words:

"To say that the universe is a rational whole appears to me true. But to treat this as an adequate account of reality appears to me false. I am equally averse to regarding the rationality of the universe as the fundamental or all-inclusive or even the dominant form of its self-expression.

"What does form a rational whole and is adequately described by this term is the movement of thought throughout the ages—in a word, the history of philosophy. To equate this movement with the universe to which it refers, to make the history of philosophy into a history of reality, appears to me an error.

"We are constantly tempted to make this equation, and constantly prevented from seeing its falsity, by the habit of treating speculative thought as a form of *ours* into which all experience must manage to fit itself. An important step towards liberation from this habit was taken by Spinoza, who treated thought as one among the infinite and eternal forms of the self-expression of substance—as one and one only. The benefits of this liberty, which relieve the mind from a very great burden, were largely sacrificed in the subsequent developments of Spinoza's doctrine.

"In much that follows I have repeated what is now common among Pluralists."

Mr. Jacks tempers his pluralism by not denying that "the universe does express itself as a rational whole." He only contends that the universe expresses itself in many ways other than rationally. Mr. Jacks continues:

"Pluralism has lost much of the strength it would otherwise have by denying, or seeming to deny, that the universe does express itself in many ways other than those which fit into the forms of conceptual logic. It is certainly true, as the Pluralists contend, that if the universe were nothing but a rational

whole—taking rational in its strict sense—the richness and variety of life would vanish and freedom would be impossible. On the other hand, if the universe were not rational, and were incapable of expressing itself in that form—if, that is, reality were forbidden by its inner constitution from taking that one among all the forms of a possible self-expression—it is equally plain that the world would be no place for beings constituted as we are.

"It will be said, no doubt, that this last statement is itself an appeal to rationality. This rejoinder, common as it has now become, merely serves to remind us once more of the saying that logic is a 'dodge.' As James has pointed out, the word 'rational' is a multidimensional term, and the constant effort of rationalism to confute all critics out of their own mouths appears to succeed only because rationalists expand the meaning of the term 'rational' with every step in the progress of their opponents' argument, and thus make it serve the changing purpose of their own."

Mr. Jacks takes a position which at first sight appears diametrically opposed to our own, for we insist most vigorously on the objective significance of science. We believe that the only philosophy (the word philosophy is here taken in its strictest sense) is "the philosophy of science." There may be innumerable different philosophies in the sense of subjective attitudes, but there is only one "philosophy of science" describing the constitution of the world and of human cognition in objective terms and arguments which are or ought to be as rigid as any of the sciences, as rigid as mathematics so far as they are purely formal, and as objective as chemistry so far as they refer to facts of experience. But while insisting on the objectivity of scientific thought, including the realm which is common to all sciences and forms their foundation, commonly called "philosophy," we not claim that the scientific world-conception is the only aspect. If the constitution of the world were not consistent in itself, reason and rational beings would be impossible, but we insist that the cosmic constitution is in itself consistent and forms an orderly whole from which reason naturally originates so as to suggest the assumption that life everywhere will tend to produce rational beings such as we are. But for all that, the development of reason is only one possible product among many others. This world does not produce rational beings only, it also produces animals, sentient beings, and unconscious organisms such as plants. All these existences are dominated by the law of consistency. Everything can be classified in uniformities, and with the help of the formal sciences we can comprehend all events in history as well as in the processes of nature. Nevertheless the scientific conception of the universe is only one view among several. The artist's view is another, which in its fundamental principle has nothing to do with an intellectual comprehension. The religious view of faith, the mystic dream of the devotee and even of the hazy visionary, the sentimentalist's longing are all as much justified as the scientist's conception. Within the realm of the human soul they are all as real and effective as, yea sometimes more powerful than, the figures of exact science. The writer has always insisted on this variety of view-points and gave an expression of it in his little pamphlet *The Philosophy of Form* as follows:

"A philosopher must not be a one-sided intellectualist. He must bear in mind that the noetic operations of man's mind are only one feature of his life; man is also endowed with sentiment, a sense of beauty, fancy, humor,

and above all he is an actor, a doer, a worker. Man is a struggling creature who must make a living; he is not a mere thinker, his thoughts serve the purpose of lief; they must be applied to the tasks which he has to accomplish in maintaining his existence and earning a livelihood. Philosophy is not mere theory; it serves the practical purpose of teaching us about the world we live in and offers suggestions as to how we are to live and to act. aMn takes delight also in giving expression to his sentiments by depicting in poetry and in art the motives that sway his soul. It would be a serious defect in a philosophy if it attempted to be purely intellectual and ignored religion, literature, the arts and music. The intellectual side is of the utmost significance and quite indispensable for the highest type of man. We must consider that only by his reason has man worked himself out of the brute state. We can never produce a better and a higher age without cultivating a scientific insight, but science is not the goal. It is only the means to the end of lifting humanity to a higher plane. We boldly maintain that a science which does not seek to ennoble the entire man is not the right kind of science. Sentiment must not be neglected any more than the intellectual faculties if we are to bring humanity to its highest and fullest expression."

Pragmatism has an anti-scientific tendency. So far as pragmatism in its positive tenets maintains that there are other view-points possible than that of intellectual comprehension, it is in its way right; but as soon as it denies science itself and would degrade it into a mere subjective attitude which is in constant subjection to reversal, it becomes a reactionary movement which will work as a brake on the wheel of progress wherever it is accepted.

Pragmatism in our opinion has gone too far in denying the objectivity of science and opposing the authority of science in its own realm. Here as well as elsewhere we must render to science that which belongs to science, to sentiment and religion, to art and to mysticism, what is theirs. True enough, science pervades all, and everything can become an object of scientific investigation; but on the other hand even science itself (or perhaps better, scientific aspirations, or the rejoicings in scientific results) may become an object of poetry. In the same way religion as well as art may in their way become as all-pervading as the cosmic order is omnipresent throughout all existence. \*